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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to begin to explore coalition behaviour in Portuguese local 
government. Electoral rules exclude formal post-electoral coalition formation here. Given this, why 
study coalition behaviour in Portuguese local government? We argue that there is a coalition-like type of 
bargaining in the form of delegation, i.e., the distribution of portfolios to some but not all members of 
councils. This makes Portuguese local governments attractive sites for study. In the paper, we first 
describe the institutional structure and rules of the game at the local government level. Second, using 
descriptive evidence on recent local election data, we look at how parties behave post-electorally and 
discuss how this behaviour in light of the portfolio allocation and coalition bargaining literature. 
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Introduction 
Government coalition formation is a well-established body of literature since the first 
studies came out in the early 1960s. Empirical studies on office- and policy-seeking behaviour, 
as well as portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies, are frequent at the national level. 
Results generally find in favor of the idea that parties are more policy-seeking than office-
seeking. Not much is said in the literature about Portugal. One could argue that this is because 
Portugal is not a particularly good case to study since, with the exception of one descriptive 
account (Magone 2000), there were very few coalitions in central government, most of them in 
the early years following the restitution of the democratic regime. Perhaps, for this reason, there 
are no empirical coalition studies on Portuguese governments. The scenario at the local 
government level is quite another thing. Studies on coalition formation at the local level are just 
now starting to make a mark on the literature. Most parliamentary local government systems are 
open fields for research on coalition formation and portfolio allocation. 
Here, we seek to explore Portuguese local government coalition behaviour. This case is 
interesting in two regards. First, it is relevant because it gets, or at least attempts to get, scholars 
theoretically and empirically interested in what goes on in Portugal with regard to coalition 
behaviour. Second, it is intriguing because there is no formal post-electoral coalition formation 
in Portugal at the local level. Despite this major institutional constraint, we argue that there is a 
coalition-like type of bargaining that takes the form delegation. Here, delegation refers to the 
distribution of portfolios among some, but not all, of the different parties comprising the 
executive councils.  
We begin with a very brief reference to the literature on coalition formation and its 
application to the local government level. We then turn our attention to the description of the 
Portuguese context and its institutional constraints, namely, the institutional structure and the 
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rules of the game at the local government level. Finally, using descriptive evidence on the most 
recent local election data, December 2001, we explore how the parties behave post-electorally. 
 
Brief General Overview of Coalition Bargaining and Portfolio Allocation 
Early explanations of coalition behaviour viewed parties as rational actors pursuing the 
goal of office. These office-seeking explanations resided in the idea that the best possible 
solution for parties competing for the spoils of government was to share as little power as 
possible. This resulted in minimal winning coalitions, that is, coalitions only as large as need be 
to secure winning and maximize cabinet durability, with partners as small as possible to 
minimize sharing spoils—minimum winning coalitions (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953; 
Riker 1962; Gamson 1961). Offices, irrespective of substance, would then be distributed 
proportionately according to the number of seats. 
Empirical evidence, however, revealed that the pure-office seeking model of coalition 
formation did not adhere very well to reality (Browne and Franklin 1973; Budge and Keman 
1990; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Bäck and Dumont 2004). Scholars argued in favor of policy 
preferences as the most important determinant of coalescence; they also argued that not all 
offices have the same bargaining value, so that it matters how the cake is cut. Empirical studies 
have shown that policy-based coalitions are in fact more applicable. This led to the relaxation of 
the pure office-seeking model—minimal connected winning coalition (Axelrod 1970),—where 
minimum winning coalitions would be more likely to form if they were connected policy-wise. 
It also led to the notion of compactness, where minimum winning coalitions would be more 
likely to form if they minimized ideological range (Leiseron 1966; de Swaan 1973). 
More recent is the incorporation of institutional constraints in theories of coalition 
formation or “coalition avoidance”, as Kaare Strom and Jorn Leipart (1993: 870) would put it.  
Early coalition theories, both office- and policy-seeking, were devoid of institutional 
considerations, such as cabinet formation rules, electoral rule, and pre-electoral agreements. 
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However, as these authors point out, institutions are relevant constraints on negotiations that 
can lead to the failure of coalescence (Strom and Leipart 1993; Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994; 
Lupia and Strom 2004).  
Portfolio allocation is an important sub-theme within the literature on coalition formation 
(Laver and Schofield 1990; Budge and Keman 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996). The portfolio 
allocation model is concerned with coalition formation, specifically with what Michael Laver 
and Kenneth Shepsle (1996) call the equilibrium cabinet, i.e., one formed by parties that will 
not have the incentive to leave it. Most empirical studies here deal with the composition and 
duration of these cabinets (Warwick and Druckman 2001); very few studies are concerned with 
the actual allocation, in other words, with “how well rewarded each member-party [can] expect 
to be in terms of ministerial portfolios”(Warwick and Druckman 2001: 627). 
 
Coalition Theories at the Local Government Level 
In the second half of the 1980s, coalition research was taken to another level, literally 
speaking. Some studies examined the potential of studying coalitions at the local level (Mellors 
and Pinjemberg 1989).  Colin Mellors recognized the sub-national governments as “a new arena 
for the study of coalitions” (Mellors 1989, see also Laver and Schofield 1990).  Despite these 
authoritative suggestions, the number of studies remains scarce, at least in comparison to the 
body of literature on the national governments.  
One of the key weaknesses of the coalition theory at the national government level is the 
circularity problem in which the same data is used to develop the theory and test it too 
(Skjæveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen 2004).  In other words, theory is usually no more 
than data description.  In this sense, local government is seen as an obvious solution to this 
problem. Not only is the number of cases substantially larger, but they are substantively 
different. In sum, local governments provide both a larger and a more varying data set.  
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There is another advantage to studying local coalitions that also has to do with theory and 
research design of the empirical tests.  On the theoretical side, it is by now well known that 
institutional constraints take on an important role in coalition formation. The earlier coalition 
theories treated parties as unconstrained actors that were more or less indiscriminate in their 
search for partners to form a minimum winning coalition (Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994). 
However, parties operate in specific institutional settings that reduce the coalition options 
available.  On the research design side, it is possible to solve the problem due to institutional 
setting variation from country to country.  Studies of local governments, therefore, are able to 
hold the institutional setting constant and control for its effect.   
Conversely, one of the greatest difficulties of these studies is been that coalition theories 
are, in fact, formulated to address the specificities of national government in parliamentary 
democracies.  This means that the theories may not hold at the local level.  They have to be 
adapted to reflect the nature of local coalitions. For example, both the Denters (1985) and 
Steunenberg (1992) studies on the Netherlands were based on the assumption that the policy 
positions of local parties match those at the national level—a rather ‘heroic’ assumption 
(Skjæveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen 2004). More recent works have improved on this 
problem by obtaining data on local party policy positions. The work of Hanna Bäck (2003) 
focusing on Sweden is based on surveys sent to local councilors.  Also, in a study on Denmark, 
Asbjørn Skjæveland, Søren Serritzlew, and Jens Blom-Hansen (2004) have measured policy 
positions through an expert survey also sent to local councilors.  Although we may object on 
the grounds that some comparability problems may be present, this procedure is a clear 
improvement.   
In addition, while the concept of coalition is clearly defined at national level, it is not 
without its problems at the local level. As Skjæveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen (2004: 9) 
put it:  
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“There are local functional equivalents to national government, but they depend 
on the specific local government system under study.  In alderman systems, the local 
council forms an executive committee to which administrative authority is delegated. 
This is a close functional equivalent to a cabinet government and has been used as 
such in studies of local coalition formation in e. g. the Netherlands. In committee 
systems, executive authority rests with the local council’s standing committees.  In 
these systems the committee chairmen have been used as the functional equivalents of 
national government.” 
 
Another difficulty emerges with the characterization of either office-seeking or policy-
seeking political actors or parties.  When is it the case that local parties seek “to maximize their 
rewards from executive office” (Strom and Leipart 1993: 870) or that local “party leaders 
pursue policy objectives at least in part because of voter demands” (Strom and Leipart 1993: 
872)? For example, according to the standard view at the national level of government, the 
formation of a oversized majority government is interpreted as a rejection of the office-seeking 
model of coalition formation, which is centered on notions related to the minimum winning 
concept.  Laver, Rallings, and Thrasher (1998) refer that “there is no compelling reason why 
policy-seeking models of government formation (…) should not be applied at the local level” 
(1998: 335). This may well be true, but, as we shall see, the Portuguese case is one where these 
concepts are tricky to define in the local context.  
Finally, local government coalition literature reveals a major imbalance. Most local 
government studies tend to focus specifically on coalition formation, bargaining, and 
“explaining and predicting coalition outcomes” (Bäck 2003: 441). Fewer studies look at the 
actual allocation of portfolios. One clear exception is the Laver, Rallings, and Thrasher (1998) 
study of British local councils. These authors argue that “the key assumption of the portfolio 
allocation model approach, applied at local level [is] that giving control of a particular council 
committee to one party rather than another implies different local policy outputs in the 
committee’s area of jurisdiction.” (1998: 336). Fewer still are studies that address portfolio 
salience, that is, “the importance or salience of the portfolios each party receives, as opposed to 
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just their quantity.” (Warwick and Druckman 2001: 627). As we will see in the next section, 
both the allocation of portfolios and their salience are determinant in explaining the functioning 
of Portuguese local party politics. 
The Portuguese Local Cabinets 
In Portugal, the most important level of local government is the municipality.1  The 
central government approves legislation on general guidelines concerning attributions of 
municipalities, competencies of local bodies, election form, as well as the local financing 
system.  This means that all municipalities have the same general limits on their political and 
policy-making activity. 
The form of government is defined by central government for all municipalities.  There 
are two main bodies, an executive body and a legislative body, elected separately in a system of 
proportional representation of closed lists and the d’Hondt method. Political parties, pre-
election coalitions of parties, and independent lists (groups of ordinary citizens) are allowed to 
run for these offices. 
The legislative body (assembleia municipal) has typical powers, such as the control of the 
executive, budget approval, housing plan, loans, and approval of large projects. The executive 
body (câmara municipal) is the governing body that runs the municipality on a day-to-day 
basis.  It is composed of 5, 7, 9, or 11 members2 (one of these members is the president of the 
council) according to the population size of the municipality.   Since the council is elected 
through the d’Hondt method, this body is multi-party.    In this sense, the executive body may 
or may not have a majority of a single party in government.  Since the decisions in weekly 
                                                 
1 There are 278 municipalities in the mainland, 19 in Azores Islands, and 11 in the Madeira Islands.  Parishes 
constitute a lower level of government; there are about 4000 of these.  Since 1976, the Portuguese constitution also 
refers to a regional level of government, the administrative region, but this level never actually existed.     
2 Because they are much larger municipalities, Lisbon and Porto have 17 and 15 members, respectively, in the 
executive body.  
 7 
meetings are dichotomous (approval vs. non-approval), when a party has the majority, it can 
proceed on its own to implement its preferred policies.   
The president of the council is the first name on the winning list running for the executive 
body. The president can roughly be seen as a “strong mayor” given his/her legal powers 
(Pereira 1991). 3  The president, among other things, implements, coordinates, and controls the 
decisions of the municipal bodies. In addition to his/her specific powers, the executive council 
can delegate many of its competencies on the president. In fact, this is the most frequent 
scenario (Pereira 1991).  The weekly executive meetings usually serve one purpose—that of 
deciding on the most important issues, precisely those that cannot be delegated. The president 
can also delegate some of his/her functions to the other council members, whether they belong 
to his/her party or not. Upon delegation, council members become responsible for one or more 
functional areas of administration on a daily basis.   
With regard to local party politics, there are some important issues to note.  In the first 
place, there are five main parties represented in the national parliament and in local 
governments. Following the Left-Right ideological spectrum, from Left to Right, they are the 
following: BE (Radical Leftists); 4 PCP-CDU (Portuguese Communist Party); Center Left–PS 
(Socialist Party); Center Right–PSD (Social Democratic Party); Extreme Right–CDS 
(Democratic Social Center). The two middle parties are the largest, usually capturing about 80-
85% of the votes and accounting for at least two thirds of the presidents of the municipality.  
Typically, though, two or three parties are represented in the executive body, meaning that 
political party competition at the local level can vary significantly. 5   
                                                 
3 Law nº 169/99 on the Attributions, Competencies, Functioning of Local Bodies.  
4 Only recently have Radical leftists won representation and mandates at the national and local levels.  But, 
contrary to what happens with the other four parties, none of the 308 municipalities is administered by this party.   
5 At the local level, we can only speculate that parties are distributed along a left-right dimension in the same way 
as parties at the national level (Mendes, Camões, and McDonald 2001; see Figure 2). We are in the course of 
collecting survey data and party manifesto data on party positions on a left-right dimension, as well as on several 
specific policy areas. Until then, we can only speculate about these positions. 
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Delegation as/or Coalition Formation? Defining the Concept of Coalition in 
Portuguese Local Government 
 
As said above, local executive council delegates functions to the president, who, in turn, 
usually delegates on the council members.  Taking into consideration that citizens´ votes 
constitute a delegation of power to representatives, a complete chain of delegation is defined.  
Figure 1 shows the complete chain of delegation at the local government level (Strom 2000: 
269; Andeweg 2000).    
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The president´s delegation to council members takes on special meaning.  We know from 
other contexts that delegation is very often selective and purposive (Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999).  We said before that when a party has a majority, it can proceed on its own, 
implementing its preferred policies.  But this may not occur; if there is no government majority 
of one party, two things may happen.  First, the government may proceed and hope for 
occasional informal coalitions to form and approve decisions on a case-by-case basis.  In this 
case, the winning party needs to gain support from minority parties; therefore, the probability of 
lengthier discussions and higher bargaining costs is much higher.  The second alternative is the 
formation of stable informal coalition bargaining. How does this happen? Since the issue in 
local Portuguese government is not about whether or not cabinets will form (the classical 
problem on the conditions of government formation, see Laver 1998), bargaining can be seen 
through the delegation of functions selectively to some council members through the allocation 
of non-proportionately divided portfolios (Budge and Keman 2000; O’Leary Grofman and Elkit 
2005).  
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The 2001 Local Government Elections  
Empirical studies on coalition formation in parliamentary democracies abound. However, 
except for José Magone (2000), who provides a descriptive account of six unstable coalitions in 
central government in the early years following the restitution of the democratic regime, there 
are no studies on Portuguese governments. One could argue that this is quite understandable 
given that the Portuguese parliamentary system is not prone to coalition formation. At the local 
government level, however, as discussed above, there is evidence of coalition-like bargaining 
behaviour. Thus, we argue that this makes Portuguese local governments attractive empirical 
study grounds. 
One cannot speak of office-seeking behaviour in the Portuguese local government context 
in the traditional sense because offices are determined on election day and solely by election 
results. No single municipal council gets to rule on its own, unless it were to earn enough votes 
to secure all seats. This means that the winning party cannot bargain away seats to another 
party. The only bargaining chips available are the portfolios. In these majority councils, the 
winning party has the prerogative to keep all portfolios. It is important to recall that portfolios 
here are not the equivalent of holding office, as is the case with the central government level in 
Portugal and most other parliamentary systems. Portfolios are governmental parties´ chance to 
actually govern. So, really, getting into the council is not the same thing as holding office, as it 
is in central government. Parties comprising the executive council per se have decision power 
only. They do not run the show on a daily basis. 
Given this, the spoils of office reside in the chance to govern. The choice in parties allows 
us to check on office- and/or policy-seeking behaviour. Depending on which parties, second or 
third winning parties, we may possibly be able to say something about whether there is office- 
or policy-seeking behaviour in local government. In the face of non-majority councils, the 
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choice to allocate or not may reveal office-seeking behaviour and the choice of party getting the 
portfolios, as well as the nature of the portfolios distributed may reveal office- or policy-
seeking behaviour. This logic is shown in Table 1; this table is a double-entry table with 
government majority/minority status information in the columns and portfolio distribution 
information in the lines. It tells us that majority councils that opt to distribute are oversized 
policy-seeking majorities. Minority governments that distribute portfolios can be minimal 
winning office-seekers or oversized coalition policy-seekers. When minority councils do not 
distribute portfolios, we can argue the case that they exhibit office-seeking-like behaviour. This 
is because governing power is not shared. Of course, this runs contrary to the standard office-
seeking model; here, minority governments would not be considered office-seeking because 
this would jeopardize coalition duration. At the local level here, however, minority councils do 
not stand to lose office in not distributing. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In this paper, we seek to assess what, if any bargaining occurred among local government 
party players. In order to do this, we look at the descriptive evidence from the most recent local 
government electoral contest in December 2001. These election results and related data refer to 
the 278 continental municipalities.6 Data on seats are available online, however data on 
portfolio allocation were gathered through a survey conducted among municipalities.  
Tables 2 through 5 present data on post-electoral schema agreed upon by the council 
parties. Table 2 lists the municipalities with minority councils, winning, and data on portfolio 
allocation. The first and foremost thing to notice is the fact that the vast majority of Portuguese 
local executive councils formed in the 2001 local election7 are not on this list, meaning that 
                                                 
6 The municipalities of the Autonomous Regions, the Azore Islands and the Madeira Islands, were excluded due to 
too few survey responses. 
7 Generally speaking this is normal at the local level in Portugal. 
 11 
they are majority councils. As expected, most of these majority councils did not allocate 
portfolios.  
Only in 34 out of 278 municipal councils were there minority councils. In these 
municipalities, the winning party had to share office with one or two other parties. In about half 
of these cases, we find that there was no portfolio allocation—14 out 34 cases.  In these 
anomalous cases, the winning party, given the option to distribute portfolios, chose not to do so; 
rather it preferred to govern alone and face opposing votes by the other parties in the council. 
This behaviour, we argue, could be viewed as “office-seeking”-like behaviour in light of the 
above discussion.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The next table, Table 3, provides us with more detailed information on the portfolios that 
were distributed and the parties getting the portfolios. These are a subset of 20 minority 
councils shown in the previous table that distributed portfolios, so there was some bargaining 
behaviour in these cases. What can we say about bargaining here? According to Table 1, these 
councils would be considered office-seekers if they are minimal winning or as policy-seekers if 
they form informal oversized majorities.  Did they allocate portfolios to the smaller parties in 
the council? Do these parties share policy preferences? In 12 cases, we see that the winning 
party distributed portfolios to the smallest party in council, resulting in office-seeking-like 
agreements that were minimal winning.8 In the remaining eight municipalities, policy-seeking 
oversized majorities formed, with four councils distributing portfolios to all council parties and 
the other four distributing portfolios only to the second winning party.  
                                                 
8 See footnote 5. 
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 It is also interesting to note that of all portfolios allocated, most fall into two broad 
categories: 1) Social Housing and Sanitation Works and 2) Recreational Activities. The key 
portfolios, such as Finance, Urban Planning or Public Construction Works, are generally not 
among those allocated. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 points out a second type of anomaly. Here, we see 16 majority councils that did 
share portfolios with other council members. According to Table 1, this would indicate that 
these are oversized policy-seeking councils. This is because the winning party could have easily 
chosen to keep all portfolios, but instead chose to bargain with other council parties. What is 
also interesting about these councils is that if we examine the portfolios distributed and the 
rewarded parties, as we did in the previous table, we see that no key portfolios were allocated. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 simply highlights the pre-electoral formal coalitions formed between the PSD and 
the PP (with one exception, Coimbra). These are cases where winning parties are office-seekers 
from the start. The parties comprising the winning coalitions would not have coalesced when 
running for office had their purpose not been the goal of office. There are 19 such coalitions; 16 
of these pre-electoral coalitions are majority councils. We see here that, in most cases (more 
than two thirds), these majorities opted to keep all portfolios. Only two coalition councils 
exhibited policy-seeking behaviour by having distributed portfolios.  
[Table 5 about here] 
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Conclusion 
This objective of this paper is to explore Portuguese local government coalition 
behaviour. We review the specificities and constraints of the Portuguese case. The most 
restrictive of these is the fact that there is no formal post-electoral coalition formation in local 
government and that local government portfolios, although equivalents to national ministries, 
are not functional equivalents of office and are not distributed according to the traditional 
literature on coalition behaviour.  
In a nutshell, we come to three preliminary conclusions. First, we find that most 
Portuguese parties at the local level are majority councils that did not allocate portfolios. 
Second, we find that, despite this, there is a type of bargaining behaviour. This occurs in the 
form of the portfolio allocation. In the few cases of majority councils that did distribute 
portfolios when they had no obligation to do so, we find evidence of policy-seeking behaviour. 
In minority councils, we mostly find what might be described as office-seeking-like behaviour. 
This is because most minority councils did distribute portfolios, but they did so to small council 
members, thus forming informal minimum winning agreements and exhibiting office-seeking-
like behaviour. Finally, we find that the portfolio salience is an important issue in Portuguese 
local government, given that the vast majority of portfolios allocated are not politically relevant   
All in all, the paper reveals that it is plausible to argue that there is coalition bargaining in 
Portuguese local government and that there appears to be a tendency toward the office-seeking 
behaviour.  
Future studies on Portuguese local government coalition bargaining will take this 
exploratory study to another level and focus on explaining what factors determine Portuguese 
oversized coalition agreements (see Serritzlew, Skjæveland, and Blom-Hansen 2005) and the 
portfolio allocation process at the root of these agreements. 
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Figure 1 The Chain of Delegation in Portuguese Local Government System   
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Figure 2: Left-Right Alignment of Major Portuguese Parties According to the Experts 
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Table  1  Delegation of Portfolios in Majority and Minority Councils 
 Distribution of Portfolios No Distribution of Portfolios 
 
Majority 
A – Oversized Majority 
Policy-Seeking 
 
B – Simple Majority 
Not applicable 
 
Minority 
C – Type of agreement? 
 Minimal winning– Office-Seeking 
 Oversized – Policy-Seeking 
D – Minority  
 Office-Seeking-like 
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Table 2  Non-Majority Winning Parties and Portfolio Allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Municipality 
Winning 
Party 
 
Total Seats 
Seats Won 
Winning 
Party 
Portfolio 
Distribution 
Alvito PS 5 2 No 
Barreiro PS 9 4 Yes 
Beja CDU 7 3 No 
Bombarral PSD 7 3 No 
Celorico da Beira MPT 5 2 No 
Chamusca CDU 5 2 Yes 
Coruche PS 7 3 Yes 
Crato PS 5 2 No 
Entroncamento PSD 7 3 Yes 
Estremoz CDU 7 3 Yes 
Lamego PS 7 3 No 
Lisboa PSD-PPM 17 8 Yes 
Loures PS 11 5 No 
Marinha Grande PS 7 3 Yes 
Mirandela PSD 7 3 Yes 
Monforte CDU 5 2 Yes 
Moura CDU 7 3 Yes 
Nisa CDU 5 2 Yes 
Odivelas PS 11 5 Yes 
Peniche PS 7 3 No 
Portalegre PSD 7 3 Yes 
Porto PSD-PP 13 6 Yes 
Santarém PS 9 4 No 
Santiago do Cacém CDU 7 3 Yes 
Sátão PSD 7 3 Yes 
Sesimbra PS 7 3 Yes 
Sintra PSD-PP 11 5 Yes 
Terras de Bouro PSD 5 2 No 
Torres Vedras PS 9 4 No 
Vale de Cambra PSD 7 3 No 
Vila do Bispo PSD 5 2 No 
Vila Real Sto António PS 7 3 No 
Vila Viçosa CDU 5 2 Yes 
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Table 3 - Portfolios Allocated by Non-Majority Winning Parties 
Municipality 
Total 
Seats 
Winning 
Party 
(Seats) 
Other Council  
Parties (Seats) 
Council 
Party 
Getting 
Portfolios 
 
Portfolios Allocated to 
Outside Party 
Barreiro 9 PS (4) CDU (4) & PSD 
(1) 
PSD  Sanitation & Public Works 
Bombarral 7 PSD (3) Ind. (2), PS (1) & 
PP(1)  
PS  Urban Planning, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Education & 
Professional Improvement 
Chamusca 5 CDU (2) PS (2) & PSD-PP 
(1) 
PS(2) & PSD-
PP(1) 
Regulation, Traffic, Economic 
Activities, Markets & Fairs, PDM, 
Social Housing, Health, Tourism, 
Supervising Commission & Jury for 
Public Works & Service Acquisition 
Coruche 7 PS (3) CDU (3) & PSD 
(1) 
PSD Urban Affairs, Water & Sanitation, 
Environment, Parks 
Entroncamento 7 PSD (3) PS (2), BE (1) & 
CDU (1) 
PS (2) & BE 
(1) 
Commerce & Industry, Markets & 
Fairs, Cultural Activities 
Estremoz 7 CDU (3) PS (2) & PSD (2) PS Sports, Markets & Fairs, 
Cemeteries, Maintenance 
Lisboa 17 PSD-PPM (8) PS-CDU (8) & 
PP (1)  
PP  Urban Maintenance, Solid Waste, 
Traffic, Mechanical Maintenance 
Marinha 
Grande 
7 PS (3) CDU (3) & PSD 
(1) 
PSD  Social Affairs, Social Housing, 
Elderly Health Care 
Mirandela 7 PSD (3) PP (3) & PS (1) PS  Sports, Tourism, Cultural Activiities 
Monforte 5 CDU (2) PS (2) & PSD-PP 
(1) 
PSD-PP  Sports, Recreational Activities 
Moura 7 CDU (3) PS (3) & PSD (1) PSD Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, 
Consumer Information 
Nisa 5 CDU (2) PSD (2) & PS (1) PSD (2) & PS 
(1) 
Sanitation, Urban Maintenance, 
Parks, Rural Development, 
Riverfront Affairs, Sports, Markets & 
Fairs, Traffic; Health, Juvenile 
Affairs; 
Odivelas  11 PS (5) PSD (4) & CDU 
(2) 
PSD (3) & 
CDU (2) 
Health, Social Housing, Tourism, 
Veterinary Services,Environment, 
Economic Acitivities, Transportation 
and Garages, General 
Administration & Judicial Counciling 
Portalegre 7 PSD (3) PS (3) & CDU 
(1) 
PS (1) & 
CDU (1) 
Sports & Recreational 
Activities, Social Works, Social 
Housing, Markets & Fairs, 
Education, Science & Cultural 
Activities, Health, Consumer 
Information 
Porto 13 PSD-PP (6) PS (6) & CDU 
(1) 
CDU  Environment, Administrative Reform 
Sant. do 
Cacém 
7 CDU (3) PS (3) & PSD (1) PSD Health, Water & Sanitation, 
Environment, Urban Affairs, 
Municipal Infrastructures, 
Electrificações, Markets & Fairs, 
Traffic, Cemeteries 
Sátão 7 PSD (3) MPT (2) & PS 
(2) 
MPT Education & Cultural Activities, Arts 
&Crafts, School Transportation, 
School Transportation, Cafeteria & 
Dormitory Management, Cultural 
Affairs, Pre-School & Day Care, 
Schools, Tourism, Social Works 
Sesimbra 7 PS (3) CDU (2) & PSD-
PP (2) 
CDU  Social Works, Health, Education, 
Social Housing, Urban Planning 
Sintra 11 PSD-PP (5) PS (4) & CDU 
(2) 
CDU Environment, Local Intervention 
Vila Viçosa 5 CDU (2) PS (2) & PSD (1) PS Sports, Markets & Fairs, Traffic, 
Cemeteries 
Table 4 - Majority Winning Parties with Portfolio Allocation  
 
Municipality 
 
Total 
Seats 
Electoral 
Winning 
Party 
(Seats) 
Non-
Electoral 
Winning 
Parties 
(Seats) 
Non-
Electoral 
Winning 
Parties 
with 
Portfolios 
Portfolios Allocation 
Alter do Chão 5 PSD (3) PS (2) PS Sports & Cultural Activities 
Alvaiázere 5 PSD (4) PS (1) PS Health 
Amadora 11 PS (6) 
PSD-PP (3) 
& CDU (2) 
CDU 
Economic Activities, Sanitation, Markets 
& Fairs, Job Placement, Tourism, Minor 
Protection 
Aveiro 9 PS (5) 
PSD (3) &  
PP (1) 
PSD 
Protecção Civil, Apoio ao Consumidor, 
Mercados e Feiras, Parque de Feiras e 
Exposições, Polícia Municipal e Saúde 
Braga 11 PS (6) 
PSD-PP-
PPM (4) & 
CDU (1) 
CDU Social Works, Social Housing, Tourism 
Coimbra 11 
PSD-PP-
PPM (6) 
PS (4) & 
CDU (1) 
CDU Social Housing 
Lousã 7 PS (6) PSD (1) PSD Traffic & Health 
Maia 9 PSD-PP (6) PS (3) PS 
Sanitation & Water Works; Sanitation 
and Safety Inspection; Art Academy 
Management, Cultural Activities, Tourist 
Establishment Inspection, Food & 
Beverage Establishment Inspection, 
Gaming Establishment Inspection, 
Commerce, Markets & Fairs, Publicity 
Mora 5 CDU (3) 
PS (1) & 
PSD (1) 
PSD Markets & Fairs 
Mourão 5 PS (4) PSD (1) PSD Health 
Oeiras 11 PSD (7) 
PS (3) & 
CDU (1) 
PS & 
CDU 
Municipal Enterprises, Property 
Management, Job Placement 
&Profissional Improvement, Sports 
Oleiros 5 PSD (4) PS (1) PS Environment, Traffic 
Seia 7 PS (4) 
PSD (2) & 
Ind. (1) 
Ind. 
Economic Development,    European 
Funds 
Seixal 11 CDU (6) 
PS (3) & 
PSD (2) 
PS & PSD 
Health, Drug Abuse Prevention, Civil 
Protection, Consumer Protection; 
Setúbal 9 CDU (6) 
PS (2) & 
PSD-PP (1) 
PS & 
PSD-PP 
Consumer Protection; Cemeteries; Health 
Tomar 7 PSD (5) PS (2) PS 
Municipal Services, Civil Protection, Fire 
Prevention 
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 Table 5   Pre-Electoral Winning Coalitions with Portfolio Allocation 
 
 
 
 
Municipality 
Winning 
Party 
 
Total Seats 
Seats Won 
by Winning 
Coalition 
Portfolios Distributed 
Alfândega da Fé PSD-PP 5 3  
Cascais PSD-PP 11 7  
Coimbra 
PSD-PP-
PPM 
11 6 Housing, Housing Project 
Management, Housing 
Infrastructure Restoration 
Estarreja PSD-PP 7 4  
Lisboa 
PSD-PPM 17 8 Urban Maintenance, Solid Waste, 
Traffic, Mechanical Maintenance 
Macedo de Cavaleiros PSD-PP 7 4  
Maia 
 
 
PSD-PP 
 
 
9 
 
 
6 
Sanitation & Water Works; 
Sanitation and Safety Inspection; 
Art Academy Management, 
Cultural Activities, Tourist 
Establishment Inspection, Food & 
Beverage Establishment Inspection, 
Gaming Establishment Inspection, 
Commerce, Markets & Fairs, 
Publicity 
Mangualde PSD-PP 7 5  
Montemor-o-Velho PSD-PP 7 4  
Penafiel PSD-PP 9 5  
Porto 
PSD-PP 13 6 Environment, Administrative 
Reform 
Ribeira de Pena PSD-PP 5 3  
Sabrosa PSD-PP 5 3  
Sabugal PSD-PP 7 4  
Sintra PSD-PP 11 5 Environment, Local Intervention 
Vila Nova de 
Famalicão 
PSD-PP 11 6  
Vila Nova de Gaia PSD-PP 11 8  
Vila Pouca de Aguiar PSD-PP 7 4  
